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UKRAINE V. RUSSIA AND PHILIPPINES V. CHINA:
JURISDICTION AND LEGITIMACY
PETER TZENGt

On September 16, 2016, Ukraine institutedproceedings against Russia under the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Commentators have drawn
parallels between this case and Philippines v. China, but key differences remain.
Through a preliminarycomparison of Ukraine v. Russia with Philippinesv. China,
this Article makes two arguments. First, the Ukraine v. Russia tribunalfaces
jurisdictional obstacles greater than those faced by the Philippines v. China
tribunal. Second, the legitimacy ofthe Ukraine v. Russia proceedings is greaterthan
that of the Philippinesv. China proceedings.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On September 16, 2016, Ukraine instituted proceedings against Russia under
Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).'
Ukraine is requesting that the Annex VII tribunal declare that Russia has violated
the Convention by interfering with Ukraine's rights in maritime zones adjacent to
t Associate, Foley Hoag LLP; Diploma, The Hague Academy of International Law; J.D., Yale
Law School; A.B., Princeton University. Email: ptzeng90@gmail.com. The author would like to thank
Jeremy Goldstein, Ariana Busby, Nicole Chaney, Rachel Ronca, and the rest of the Denver Journalof
InternationalLaw and Policy editorial team for their excellent editing, feedback, and suggestions. The
views expressed in this Article are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of
any institution with which the author is affiliated.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Annex VII, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, 571 [hereinafter UNCLOS]; Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov,
and Kerch Strait (Ukr. v. Russ.), PCA Case No. 2017-06, Rules of Procedure, art. 3 (May 18, 2017),
https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/2136. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine had reported
earlier that Ukraine instituted proceedings on September 14, 2016. Statement of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Ukraine on the Initiation of Arbitration against the Russian Federation under the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. UKR. (Sept. 14, 2016, 3:16 PM),
http://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-center/news/50813-zajava-mzs-ukrajini-shhodo-porushennya-arbitrazhnogoprovadzhennya-proti-rosijsykoji-federaciji-vidpovidno-do-konvenciji-oon-z-morsykogo-prava
[hereinafter Ukrainian Statement on Arbitration]. This UNCLOS arbitration should not be confused with
the proceedings that Ukraine has filed against Russia before the International Court of Justice and the
European Court of Human Rights. See Application of the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, Order (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.icjcij.org/files/case-related/1 66/19394.pdf; EUR. CT H.R., PRESS COUNTRY PROFILE: RUSSIA 18-19 (May
2017), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CPRussiaENG.pdf.
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Crimea.2
Commentators have drawn parallels between this case and Philippines v.
China.' In both cases, a less powerful state is suing a permanent member of the U.N.
Security Council. In both cases, the less powerful state has brought the case before
an Annex VII tribunal under UNCLOS. And in both cases, the tribunal's exercise of
jurisdiction over the dispute arguably implicates issues of territorial sovereignty over
4
which the tribunal does not have jurisdiction ratione materiae.
Key differences, however, remain. Although the Ukrainev. Russia proceedings
have only just begun, publicly available information allows for a preliminary
comparison of Ukraine v. Russia with Philippines v. China. This Article makes two
arguments in this regard. First, the Ukraine v. Russia tribunal faces jurisdictional
obstacles greater than those faced by the Philippines v. China tribunal (Part II).
Second, the legitimacy of the Ukraine v. Russia proceedings is greater than that of
the Philippinesv. China proceedings (Part III).

II.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL

Russia can raise a variety of objections to the jurisdiction of the Ukraine v.
Russia tribunal. Two stand out in particular because they were also raised by China
in Philippinesv. China5 : (1) the implication of territorial sovereignty issues (Section
II.A); and (2) Article 28 1(1) of UNCLOS (Section II.B). A preliminary examination
of these two objections reveals that Russia's arguments on these two grounds are
stronger than China's arguments were.

2. Ukrainian Statement on Arbitration, supra note 1. For a more detailed description of Ukraine's
claims, see Kyiv Ready File Claim Against Russia's Violation of UN Convention on Law of Sea, No

Political

Decision

of

Authorities,

INTERFAX-UKR.

(Jan.

29,

2016,

9:49

AM),

http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/320835.html.

3. South China Sea (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-19, Award (July 12, 2016) [hereinafter
Phil. v. China, Award]; South China Sea (Phil. v. China), PCA Case No. 2013-09, Award on Jurisdiction
and Admissibility (Oct. 29, 2015) [hereinafter Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility];
see, e.g., Alison Ross & Sebastian Perry, Ukraine Brings Maritime Claim Against Russia, GLOBAL ARB.
REV. (Sept. 23, 2016); Julian Ku, As Ukraine Prepares to Take Russia to UNCLOS Arbitration Over
Crimea,
I
Predict
Russia's
Likely
Reaction,
OPTNIO
JURIS
(Feb.
1,
2016),

http://opiniojuris.org/2016/02/01 /ukraine-prepares-to-take-russia-to-unclos-arbitration/;
Julian
Ku,
Ukraine's UNCLOS Arbitration Claim Against Russia May Depend Upon Philippines-ChinaPrecedent,
OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 17, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/09/17/ukraines-unclos-arbitration-claimagainst-russia-may-depend-upon-philippines-china-precedent/; Brian McGarry, The Courthouse Proxy

Wars, Pt. II, WESTPHALIAN (Feb. 26, 2016), http://thewestphalian.com/analysis/2016/02/26.
4. See Peter Tzeng, The Doctrine of Indispensable Issues: Mauritius v. United Kingdom,

Philippines v.

China,

Ukraine v.

Russia,

and Beyond,

EJL: TALK!

(Oct.

14,

2016),

http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-doctrine-of-indispensable-issues-mauritius-v-united-kingdom-philippines-vchina-ukraine-v-russia-and-beyond/; see infra Section II.A.

5. China did not formally participate in the Philippines v. China proceedings, but its Ministry of
Foreign Affairs published a "position paper" raising various jurisdictional objections. See PositionPaper
of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China
Sea ArbitrationInitiatedby the Republic of the Philippines, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF CHINA (Dec.

7, 2014), http://www.fnprc.gov.cn/mfa-eng/zxxx_662805/tl217147.shtml.
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A. The Implication of TerritorialSovereignty Issues
Russia can argue that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction because the dispute
implicates territorial sovereignty issues. Article 288(1) of UNCLOS defines the
jurisdiction of UNCLOS tribunals. It provides that UNCLOS tribunals "shall have
jurisdiction over any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention."' As Ukraine has framed the dispute as one concerning rights in
maritime zones adjacent to Crimea,' the dispute on its face concerns the
interpretation and application of provisions of UNCLOS.8 Nevertheless, in light of
Russia's annexation of Crimea, the dispute also implicates issues of territorial
sovereignty, issues that do not concern the interpretation or application of UNCLOS
and thus fall outside the jurisdiction ratione materiaeof the tribunal.9 The question,
then, is whether the UNCLOS tribunal may still exercise jurisdiction over the
maritime dispute. The two UNCLOS cases that have addressed this questionMauritius v. United Kingdomlo and Philippinesv. Chinal -are not very favorable
to Ukraine.
The case of Mauritiusv. United Kingdom concerned the Chagos Archipelago,
a group of approximately sixty islands in the Indian Ocean.' 2 As early as 1980,
Mauritius and the United Kingdom had each claimed sovereignty over the islands.' 3
In April 2010, however, the United Kingdom unilaterally established a marine
protected area (MPA) around the archipelago.14 Six months later, Mauritius
instituted UNCLOS proceedings against the United Kingdom." Mauritius's first
submission was that "the United Kingdom is not entitled to declare [the MPA]
because it is not the 'coastal State' within the meaning of [UNCLOS]." 1In essence,
Mauritius was arguing that since it had sovereignty over the archipelago (i.e., since
it was the relevant "coastal State"), the United Kingdom interfered with its rights by

6. UNCLOS, supra note 1, at 510, art. 288(1).
7. See Ukrainian Statement on Arbitration, supra note 1.
8. UNCLOS contains provisions on States' rights in their adjacent maritime zones. See, e.g.,
UNCLOS, supra note 1, pts. II (territorial sea and contiguous zone), V (exclusive economic zone), VI
(continental shelf).
9. See KRIANGSAK KITTICHAISAREE, THE LAW OF THE SEA AND MARITIME BOUNDARY

DELIMITATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 140 (1987); Irina Buga, TerritorialSovereignty Issues in Maritime
Disputes:A JurisdictionalDilemmafor Law of the Sea Tribunals, 27 INT'L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 59,
68, 70-71 (2012); Bernard H. Oxman, Courts and Tribunals: The ICJ, ITLOS andArbitralTribunals, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 394, 400 (Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds., 2015).

10. Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K), PCA Case No. 2011-03, Award (Mar. 18,
2015), https://files.pca-cpa.org/pcadocs/MU-UK%2020150318%2OAward.pdf [hereinafter Mauritius v.
U.K., Award].
11. Phil. v. China, Award, supra note 3; Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
supranote 3.
12. Sandra J.T.M. Evers & Marry Kooy, Redundancy on the Instalment Plan: Chagossiansand the
Right to be Calleda People, in EvICTION FROM THE CHAGOS ISLANDS: DISPLACEMENT AND STRUGGLE
FOR IDENTITY AGAINST Two WORLD POWERS 1, I (Sandra J.T.M. Evers & Marry Kooy eds., 2011).
13. See Mauritius v. U.K., Award, supra note 10, 1 103.

14. Id. T 5
15. Id. 1514.
16. Id

1 158.
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declaring the MPA.'" The United Kingdom, however, argued that the sovereignty
dispute was "the real issue in the case"' 8 and lay at "the heart of the current claim,""
such that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over this first submission.

'

The tribunal began its assessment of its jurisdiction by characterizing the
dispute,2 0 in particular by evaluating "where the relative weight of the dispute lies." 2
In making this evaluation, the tribunal observed:
There is an extensive record, extending across a range of fora and
instruments, documenting the Parties' dispute over sovereignty .....
Moreover, . . . the consequences of a finding that the United Kingdom is
not the coastal State extend well beyond the question of the validity of
the MPA.

22

In light of these two observations, the tribunal concluded that "the Parties'
dispute with respect to Mauritius' First Submission is properly characterized as
relating to land sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago." 23 As a result, the tribunal
found itself without jurisdiction to address Mauritius's first submission. 24 The
tribunal noted in obiter dictum, however, that if the dispute were properly
characterized as an UNCLOS dispute, it would have had the jurisdiction to settle
"ancillary" issues of territorial sovereignty. 25
The case of Philippines v. China concerned China's maritime claims and
activities in the South China Sea. 26 In January 2013, the Philippines instituted
UNCLOS proceedings against China, 2 7 seeking, inter alia, declarations that China's
maritime claims based on its nine-dash line are invalid, and that certain maritime
features in the South China Sea are properly characterized as rocks or low-tide
elevations. 28 The Philippines asserted that none of its submissions "require[d] the
Tribunal to express any view at all as to the extent of China's sovereignty over land
territory." 29 Although China did not formally participate in the proceedings,30 its
Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted in a "position paper" that the tribunal did not
have jurisdiction because "the essence of the subject-matter of the arbitration is

17. See id
18. Id 1 164.
19. Id 1170.
20. See id. T 208, 211.
21. Id. 1211.
22. Id.
23. Id.1212.
24. ld. 1221.
25. Id.
26. See Phil. v. China, Award, supra note 3, 1 2; Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, supra note 3, ¶f 4-6.
27. Phil. v. China, Award, supra note 3, 1 4; Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, supra note 3, 1 2.
28. Phil. v. China, Award, supra note 3, 1 112; Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, supra note 3, ¶ 99.
29. Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 3, 1 141.
30. Phil. v. China, Award, supra note 3, 1 11.
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territorial sovereignty." 3 1
Like the Mauritius v. United Kingdom tribunal, the Philippines v. China
tribunal began its assessment of its jurisdiction by characterizing the dispute.3 2
Unlike the Mauritius v. UnitedKingdom tribunal, however, the Philippinesv. China
tribunal expressly adopted a two-part test to answer the characterization question. It

held:
The Tribunal might consider that the Philippines' Submissions could be
understood to relate to sovereignty if it were convinced that either (a) the
resolution of the Philippines' claims would require the Tribunal to first
render a decision on sovereignty, either expressly or implicitly; or (b) the
actual objective of the Philippines' claims was to advance its position in
the Parties' dispute over sovereignty.33
Applying this two-part test to the facts of the case, the tribunal held that the
resolution of the Philippines' claims did not require it to first render a decision on
sovereignty, and that the actual objective of the Philippines' claims was not to
advance its position in the dispute over sovereignty.3 4 The tribunal therefore upheld
its jurisdiction over the dispute."
In Ukraine v. Russia, Ukraine, like Mauritius, is asserting "its rights as the
coastal state in maritime zones adjacent to Crimea."36 Therefore, like Mauritius,
Ukraine is in essence arguing that since it has sovereignty over Crimea (i.e., since it
is the relevant "coastal state"), Russia has interfered with its rights.3 7 If the Ukraine
v. Russia tribunal follows the approach of the Mauritius v. United Kingdom tribunal
or that of the Philippinesv. China tribunal, it will likely find that it does not have
jurisdiction over the dispute.
Under the Mauritiusv. United Kingdom approach, the tribunal would examine
the historical record of the dispute and the consequences of a finding that Russia is
not the relevant "coastal State." 38 The historical record of the dispute would probably
show that the dispute has primarily been about sovereignty over Crimea; the
question of maritime rights is just an extension of the sovereignty dispute. And a
finding that Russia is not the "coastal State," like a finding that the United Kingdom
is not the "coastal State" in Mauritius v. UnitedKingdom, would have consequences
that extend well beyond the dispute concerning Russia's actions in the waters
adjacent to Crimea. Indeed, such a finding would imply that Russia does not have
sovereignty over Crimea. As a result, under the Mauritius v. United Kingdom
approach, the tribunal would likely conclude that the "relative weight of the dispute"
lies in the sovereignty dispute, such that the tribunal would not have jurisdiction.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 3,
Id. 1150.
Id. 11 153.
Id.
Id.
Ukrainian Statement on Arbitration, supra note 1 (emphasis added).
See Mauritius v. U.K., Award, supra note 10, 1 158.

38.

See supranote 22 and accompanying text.

1

133.
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Under the Philippines v. China approach, the tribunal would examine whether
the resolution of Ukraine's claims would require it to first render a decision on
sovereignty, and also whether the "actual objective" of Ukraine's claims is to
advance its position in the sovereignty dispute. 9 As for the first question, there is
little doubt that the resolution of Ukraine's claims would require the tribunal to first
render a decision on sovereignty over Crimea. After all, under the "land dominates
the sea" principle,4 0 Ukraine does not have the rights it claims in the maritime zones
adjacent to Crimea unless it has sovereignty over Crimea. As for the second
question, the "actual objective" of Ukraine's claims is not as clear. But in light of
the fact that the two-part test is alternative rather than cumulative,4 1 the tribunal
could rely solely on its answer to the first question to conclude that the dispute is
most properly characterized as a sovereignty dispute that falls outside the tribunal's
jurisdiction.4 2
In conclusion, in adopting either approach, the Ukraine v. Russia tribunal
would likely characterize the dispute as a sovereignty dispute, such that it would fall
outside the tribunal's jurisdiction. Nevertheless, this is not at all to say that it is a
foregone conclusion that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the dispute.
There are at least three reasons why the tribunal might still find that it has jurisdiction
over the dispute.
First, the tribunal could choose to not follow the methods by which the
Mauritius v. United Kingdom and Philippines v. China tribunals characterized the
disputes before them. Indeed, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not
prescribed a specific method for characterizing disputes; it recently reaffirmed that
"[i]t is for the Court itself . . to determine on an objective basis the subject-matter
of the dispute" and "[i]n doing so, the Court examines the positions of both parties,
'while giving particular attention to the formulation of the dispute chosen by the
[a]pplicant.'" 4 3 In other words, the Ukraine v. Russia tribunal could define for itself
the best means of characterizing the dispute, tailored to the specific dispute before

39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. The "land dominates the sea" principle provides that maritime entitlements derive from
sovereignty over land. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep.
624, 1 140 (Nov. 19); Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Rom. v. Ukr.), Judgment, 2009 1.C.J. Rep.
89, j 77 (Feb. 3); Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Hond.), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 659, 1
126 (Oct. 8); Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v.
Bahr.), Judgment, Merits, 2001 1.C.J. Rep. 61, 1 185 (Mar. 16); Gulf of Maine (Can./U.S.), 1984 I.C.J.
Rep. 246, 1| 157 (Oct. 12); Continental Shelf (Tunis./Libya), 1982 1.C.J. Rep. 18, T 73 (Feb. 24); Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 186 (Dec. 19); North Sea Continental Shelf
(Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 1 96 (Feb. 20).
41. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
42. To be precise, under the Philippines v. China approach, the tribunal could only conclude that
Ukraine's submissions "could be understood to relate to sovereignty." Nevertheless, the Philippines v.
China tribunal appeared to hold that this would likely lead to the conclusion that the dispute falls outside
the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
43. Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), Preliminary Objection,
Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep., 126 (Sept. 24) (quoting Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Can.), Jurisdiction,
Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. Rep. 432, 1 30 (Dec. 4)).
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it.

Second, even if the tribunal were to follow the Mauritius v. United Kingdom
approach, it might reach a different conclusion with regard to the historical record
of the dispute. After all, unlike in Mauritius v. United Kingdom, over the past three
years there have been developments concerning the dispute between Ukraine and
Russia over the maritime areas adjacent to Crimea.'
Third, and perhaps most significantly, Ukraine could try to assert that there is
no legitimate legal dispute concerning sovereignty over Crimea. According to
Ukraine, Russia violated the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of
territorial integrity in annexing Crimea, 45 and, under the principle of ex injuriajus
non oritur, "facts which flow from wrongful conduct [cannot] determine the law." 4 6
Moreover, the U.N. General Assembly, 47 the Venice Commission,48 the Chair of the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 49 and many commentators5 0
have considered the Crimea referendum to be invalid. Under this theory, Ukraine
would argue that its sovereignty over Crimea is a factual matter, such that the only
relevant legal dispute for the UNCLOS tribunal is whether Russia interfered with its
rights in the maritime zones adjacent to Crimea.

-

44. See, e.g., Advandazy, Will A Bridge Between the Crimea and Russia Violate International
Law?, CIS ARB. F. (Jan. 28, 2015), http://www.cisarbitration.com/2015/01/28/will-a-bridge-betweenthe-crimea-and-russia-violate-intemational-law/; Michel Chossudovsky, Crisis in Ukraine: Russia
Extends Its Control over the Black Sea and Strategic Waterways, GLOBAL RESEARCH (Mar. 18, 2014),
http://www.globalresearch.ca/russia-extends-its-control-over-the-black-sea-and-strategicwaterways/537402 1; Russia Violates Maritime Law by Exploring Annexed Part of Azov Sea Shelf
Border Guards, UNIAN (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.unian.info/politics/1629516-russia-violatesmaritime-law-by-exploring-annexed-part-of-azov-sea-shelf-border-guards.html.
45. U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 80th plen. mtg. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. A/68/PV.80 (Mar. 27, 2014).
46. Gabgikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 88, 1 133 (Sept.
25).
47. G.A. Res. 68/262, ¶ 5, Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/262 (Mar. 27,
2014) ("The GeneralAssembly ... [u]nderscoresthat the referendum held in the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol on 16 March 2014, having no validity, cannot form the basis for any
alteration of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or the city of Sevastopol .... ).
48. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on
"Whether the Decision Taken By the Supreme Councilof the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in Ukraine
to Organise a Referendum Becoming a Constituent Territory of the Russian Federation or Restoring
Crimea's 1992 Constitution is Compatible with Constitutional Principles," ¶¶ 27-28, Opinion No.
762/2014 (Mar. 21, 2014).
49. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, OSCE ChairSays Crimean Referendum
in its Current Form is Illegal and Calls for Alternative Ways to Address the Crimean Issue (Mar. 11,
2014), http://www.osce.org/cio/1 16313.
50. E.g., Baiju S. Vasani et al., Crisis in Crimea: Is Your Foreign Investment There ProtectedBy
a Treaty?, JONES DAY (Apr. 10, 2014), http://www.jonesday.com/crisis-in-crimea-is-your-foreigninvestment-there-protected-by-a-treaty-04-10-2014/ ("The international community, including the
United Nations, is likely to continue to see Crimea as part of Ukraine under international law. . . .");
Yaraslau Kryvoi & Maria Tsarova, ProtectingForeign Investors in Crimea: Is Investment Arbitration an
Option?, CIS ARB. F. (July 29, 2014), http://www.cisarbitration.com/2014/07/29/protecting-foreigninvestors-in-crimea-is-investment-arbitration-an-option/ ("There is a strong argument that nonrecognition by nearly all states in the world of Crimea's annexation means that under international law
Crimea is not a part of Russia. . . .").
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Although the jury may still be out on whether the tribunal has jurisdiction over
the dispute, there is no doubt that the jurisdictional obstacle that the tribunal faces in
this regard is greater than that which the Philippines v. China tribunal faced.
B. Article 281(1) of UNCLOS
Russia can also argue that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction, at least over
parts of the dispute, because of Article 281(1) of UNCLOS. Article 281(1) provides:
If the States Parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention have agreed to seek
settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice, the
procedures provided for in this Part [including compulsory arbitration]
apply only where no settlement has been reached by recourse to such
means and the agreement between the parties does not exclude any further
procedure.s'
Article 281(1) thus imposes two requirements 52 for excluding the jurisdiction
of an UNCLOS tribunal: (1) the parties must "have agreed to seek settlement of the
dispute by a peaceful means of their own choice"; and (2) the agreement must
"exclude . . further procedure[s]." Many UNCLOS tribunals, as well as the TimorLeste v. Australia conciliation commission, have interpreted and applied Article
281(1), 3 but only two cases examined Article 281(1) in depth and are relevant for
Ukraine v. Russia: Southern Bluefin Tuna and Philippinesv. China.
In Southern Bluefin Tuna,5 4 the tribunal considered whether Article 16 of the
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) could exclude
the tribunal's jurisdiction under Article 281(l). 5 Article 16 provides:
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Parties concerning the
interpretation or implementation of this Convention, those Parties shall
consult among themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by

51. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 281(1).
52. Note that if one assumes that the requirement that "no settlement has been reached by recourse
to such means" includes a requirement for one or both states to genuinely attempt to settle the dispute by
recourse to such means, then the jurisdiction of the tribunal could also be excluded if (1) the first
requirement is met; and (2) neither state has genuinely attempted to settle the dispute by recourse to such
means. Since it is not publicly known whether and to what extent Russia and/or Ukraine attempted to
settle any dispute by recourse to any of the means provided for in the relevant treaties, this possibility is
not discussed in this Article.
53. E.g., Timor-Leste v. Australia, PCA Case No. 2016-10, Decision on Australia's Objections to
Competence, In 48-64 (Sept. 19, 2016); Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra
note 3, IM 193-289; Barb./Trin. & Tobago, Award, 27 R.I.A.A. 147, 1 200(ii) (Apr. 11, 2006); Land
Reclamation in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v. Sing.), ITLOS Case No. 12, Provisional
Measures, Order, %¶53-57 (Oct. 8, 2003); MOX Plant (Ir. v. U.K), PCA Case No. 2002-01, Procedural
Order No. 3, ¶ 18 (June 24, 2003); Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan), Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 23 R.I.A.A. 1, In 53-63 (Aug. 4, 2000) [hereinafter Southern Bluefin
Tuna, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility]; Southern Bluefin Tuna (N.Z. v. Japan; Austl. v. Japan),
ITLOS Case Nos. 3 and 4, Provisional Measures, Order, 1 56 (Aug. 27, 1999).
54. Southern Bluefin Tuna, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 53.
55. Id.In53-59.
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negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice.

judicial

2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent in
each case of all parties to the dispute, be referred for settlement to the
International Court of Justice or to arbitration; but failure to reach
agreement on reference to the International Court of Justice or to
arbitration shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility
of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means
referred to in paragraph I above.
3. In cases where the dispute is referred to arbitration, the arbitral tribunal
shall be constituted as provided in the Annex to this Convention ... 56

With respect to the first requirement, the tribunal found that Article 16
constituted an agreement "to seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful means of
their own choice," even though (1) Article 16 applies only to CCSBT disputes, not
UNCLOS disputes; (2) Article 16 provides for multiple (not "a") peaceful means of
settlement; (3) Article 16 is open-ended in also allowing for "other peaceful means
of [the parties'] own choice"; and (4) "[n]o particular procedure [among the choices
had] been chosen by the Parties."" The first point is perhaps the most critical. In this
regard, the tribunal expressly held:
[T]he Parties to this [UNCLOS] dispute .. are the same Parties grappling
not with two separate disputes but with what in fact is a single dispute
arising under both Conventions. To find that, in this case, there is a
dispute actually arising under UNCLOS which is distinct from the dispute
58
that arose under the CCSBT would be artificial.

With respect to the second requirement, the tribunal held that "the absence of
an express exclusion . .. is not decisive."" It found that Articles 16(2) and 16(3)
reveal that "the intent of Article 16 is to remove proceedings under that Article from
the reach of [the compulsory dispute settlement procedures under UNCLOS],"60
such that Article 16 "exclude[s] any further procedure" within the meaning of
Article 281(1) of UNCLOS. 6 1 As a result, the tribunal concluded that Article 16
excluded its jurisdiction over the dispute. 6 2
In Philippinesv. China, the tribunal considered whether multiple instruments
could exclude its jurisdiction under Article 281(1): the 2002 ASEAN-China
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, various ChinaPhilippines bilateral statements, the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast

56.
U.N.T.S.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna art. 16, May 10, 1993, 1819
360.
Southern Bluefin Tuna, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 53, 1154-55.
Id ¶54.
Id. 57.
Id.
Id ¶59.
Id. IM59, 65, 72(1).
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Asia, and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 63 The tribunal found that
none of these instruments satisfied either of the two requirements, let alone both.64
It dismissed the ASEAN-China Declaration,6 5 the various bilateral statements, 66 and
the Treaty of Amity 67 on the basis of the first requirement because they did not
contain any binding agreement for the settlement of disputes. The tribunal's rulings
on the CBD and the second requirement, however, deserve a closer examination, as
they were in tension with Southern Bluefin Tuna.
As for the CBD, the Philippines v. China tribunal held that the CBD's
provisions on dispute settlement were inapplicable because the dispute before it was
an UNCLOS dispute, not a CBD dispute.6 The tribunal agreed with the Philippines'
assertion that "[a] dispute under UNCLOS does not become a dispute under the CBD
merely because there is some overlap between the two. Parallel regimes remain
parallel regimes." 69 This notion of "parallel" disputes contrasts with the Southern
Bluefin Tuna tribunal's notion of a "single" dispute.70 Nevertheless, the two cases
may perhaps be reconciled based on the content of the underlying disputes in
question.
As for the second condition, the Philippines v. China tribunal held that it was
not satisfied by any of the instruments because it required a "clear" and "express"
exclusion of further procedures, 7 1 and none of the instruments contained such an
exclusion. 72 As the tribunal itself recognized,'7 3 this holding directly contradicted the
Southern Bluefin Tuna tribunal's holding that, for the second requirement, "the
74
absence of an express exclusion . . . is not decisive."
In Ukraine v. Russia, Russia can invoke at least three treaties to try to exclude
the tribunal's jurisdiction under Article 281(1): the 1997 Treaty on Friendship,
Cooperation and Partnership Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation (the
Friendship Treaty),' the 2003 Treaty Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
on the Ukrainian-Russian State Border (the Border Treaty), 7' and the 2003 Treaty
Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea
of Azov and the Strait of Kerch (the Cooperation Treaty). 7 Although Ukraine can

63. Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supranote 3, ¶ 193-289.
64. Id.

65. Id. Jll215-19.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. 1 245.
Id 1265.
Id.111281-85.
Id.'285.

70.

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

71. Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supranote 3, ' 224.
72. Id ¶1 222, 246, 268, 286.
73. Id 1223.
74. Southern Bluefin Tuna, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 53, 157.
75. Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Between Ukraine and the Russian
Federation, Russ.-Ukr., May 31, 1997, U.N.T.S. No. 52240 [hereinafter Friendship Treaty].
76.

Treaty Between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Ukrainian-Russian State Border,

Russ.-Ukr., Jan. 28, 2003, U.N.T.S. No. 54132 [hereinafter Border Treaty].
77. Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the Ukraine on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea
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still make a cogent argument that none of these treaties can successfully exclude the
tribunal's jurisdiction under Article 281(1), the issues are more complicated. At the
very least, all three treaties are legally binding instruments that contain binding
agreements to settle certain disputes in a certain manner. 8 In Philippines v. China,
that was only true of the CBD."9 Below, the Friendship Treaty, the Border Treaty,
and the Cooperation Treaty are analyzed in turn. The goal here is not to come to a
conclusion on whether they can exclude the tribunal's jurisdiction under Article
28 1(1). Rather, the goal is simply to flag the issues that the tribunal will have to deal
with.
First, with respect to the Friendship Treaty, Article 37 provides: "Disputes
concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty shall be settled through
consultation and negotiations between the High Contracting Parties.""o As for the
first requirement, there is no doubt that, by virtue of Article 37, Ukraine and Russia
"have agreed to seek settlement of [a] dispute by a peaceful means of their own
choice." 8 ' The tribunal, however, will have to determine whether the dispute in
Ukraine v. Russia is a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
Friendship Treaty. This raises the issue of whether the dispute under UNCLOS and
the dispute under the Friendship Treaty constitute a "single" dispute as in Southern
Bluefin Tuna82 or "parallel" disputes as in Philippinesv. China.83 As for the second
requirement, there is no express exclusion in the Friendship Treaty, so the
requirement would not be met under Philippines v. China.84 Nevertheless, the
Ukraine v. Russia tribunal could, like the Southern Bluefin Tuna tribunal, look for
contextual clues to find an implied exclusion.
Second, with respect to the Border Treaty, Article 5 provides: "Questions
relating to contiguous maritime waters shall be settled by agreement between the
Contracting Parties in accordance with international law." 85 As for the first
requirement, the principal question will be whether the dispute involves "[q]uestions
relating to contiguous maritime waters." 86 If so, then the second requirement once
again raises the issue of whether, under Southern Bluefin Tuna, contextual clues may
indicate an implied exclusion.
Finally, with respect to the Cooperation Treaty, there are a few provisions that

of Azov and the Strait of Kerch, Russ.-Ukr., Dec. 24, 2003, http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/bi-45795.doc
[hereinafter Cooperation Treaty].
78. Friendship Treaty, supra note 75, art. 37; Border Treaty, supra note 76, art. 5; Cooperation
Treaty, supra note 77, art. 4.

79. Compare Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 3, if 270, 272
(stating that the CBD is a multilateral treaty and quoting its dispute settlement provisions), with id.

¶M

215-19, 245, 265 (finding that the ASEAN-China Declaration, the various bilateral statements, and the
Treaty of Amity did not contain any binding agreement for a particular form of dispute settlement).

80.
81.

Friendship Treaty, supra note 75, art. 37 (author translation).
UNCLOS, supranote 1, art. 281(1).

82.

Southern Bluefin Tuna, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 53, T 54.

83. Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supranote 3,
84. See supra text accompanying notes 71-74.
85.

Border Treaty, supranote 76, art. 5 (author translation).

86. Id.

1285.
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Russia could invoke as agreements to "seek settlement of the dispute by a peaceful
means of [the parties'] own choice."" First, the preamble contains the following
language: "The Russian Federation and Ukraine, . . . [c]onvinced that all issues
relating to the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait must be resolved only by peaceful
means jointly or by agreement between Russia and Ukraine; ... ."8
The preamble of course does not contain binding obligations." But it may be
used to help interpret the articles of the treaty.90 There are two articles that directly
touch on the question of dispute settlement:

'

Article 1.... The settlement of issues related to the Kerch Strait maritime
area shall be carried out by agreement between the Parties.9
Article 4. Disputes between the Parties related to the interpretation and
application of the present Treaty shall be resolved through consultations
and negotiations, as well as by other peaceful means chosen by the
Parties. 92
Article 1 by its own terms applies only to the Kerch Strait. 93 As a result, if
Article I were to exclude the tribunal's jurisdiction under Article 28 1(1), it would
do so only with respect to the Kerch Strait, not the Sea of Azov or the Black Sea.
Article 1 appears to satisfy the first requirement because it represents an agreement
"to seek settlement of [disputes related to the Kerch Strait] by a peaceful means of
[the parties'] own choice," 94 namely by "agreement." 9 ' Nevertheless, as with the
Border Treaty, it is unclear whether this agreement to carry out "[t]he settlement of
issues . . . by agreement" excludes UNCLOS dispute settlement. At the very least, if
the tribunal follows the Philippinesv. China approach, it is not an express exclusion
of further procedures.
Article 4 is also limited geographically, since the Cooperation Treaty applies
only to the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait.96 Under Southern Bluefin Tuna, the
fact that Article 4 provides for multiple (not "a") peaceful means of settlement and
that it is open-ended in also allowing for "other peaceful means chosen by the
Parties" do not disqualify Article 4 from being an agreement "to seek settlement of
the dispute by a peaceful means of [the parties'] own choice."" Nevertheless, Article
4 must confront the same question that arises for the Friendship Treaty: can the

87. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 281(1).
88. Cooperation Treaty, supra note 77, pmbl. (author translation).
89. MAKANE MOYSE MBENGUE, Preamble, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW
I1 (Sept. 2006) ("Generally, in international law preambles are not capable of
creating binding legal effects upon parties.").
90. Id. 1 3 ("It is widely accepted that a preamble has a very important role in the interpretation of
treaties.").
91. Cooperation Treaty, supra note 77, art. I (author translation).
92. Id. art. 4 (author translation).

93. Id art. 1.
94. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 281(1).
95. Cooperation Treaty, supra note 77, art. 1.
96. The title, preamble, and all substantive provisions of the Cooperation Treaty refer only to the

Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait. See id pmbl., arts. 1-3.
97. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 281(1).
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dispute under UNCLOS and a dispute under the Cooperation Treaty be considered
a "single" dispute as in Southern Bluefin Tuna, or are they instead "parallel" disputes
as in Philippinesv. China?
Finally, one cannot forget the preamble. Although the preamble itself does not
contain any legally binding obligations, it perhaps suggests that, in case of
ambiguity, Articles 1 and 4 should be interpreted as exclusions of further procedures.
All this is not to say that there is a clear answer to any of these questions.
Rather, it is only to say that the jurisdictional obstacles the Ukraine v. Russia tribunal
faces under Article 281(1) is greater than that which the Philippinesv. China tribunal
faced under this article.
III.

THE LEGITIMACY OF THE PROCEEDINGS

It is difficult to ascertain the "legitimacy" of a set of international dispute
settlement proceedings. This Article does not aim to enter the rich academic debate
on defining "legitimacy." 98 Nevertheless, most would agree that two important
factors enhance the legitimacy of a set of proceedings: (1) the equal participation of
the parties (Section III.A); and (2) the optics of the impartiality of the tribunal
(Section III.B). Based on these two factors alone, this Part argues that, as of the time
of writing of this Article, the legitimacy of the Ukraine v. Russia proceedings is
greater than that of the Philippines v. China proceedings.
A. The Equal Participationof the Parties
The principle of audi alterampartem provides that all parties to a dispute must
be heard." Nevertheless, states have on multiple occasions refused to participate in
interstate dispute settlement proceedings.'o Annex VII of UNCLOS expressly
contemplates this possibility. Article 9 of Annex VII provides:
If one of the parties to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral
tribunal or fails to defend its case, the other party may request the tribunal
to continue the proceedings and to make its award. Absence of a party or
failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the
proceedings.' 01
This provision is in line not only with the Statute of the Permanent Court of

98. See Nienke Grossman, The Normative Legitimacy ofInternationalCourts, 86 TEMP. L. REV.
61 (2013); Yonatan Lupu, International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons from National Courts, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 437 (2013); Geir Ulfstein, InternationalCourts and Judges: Independence,

Interaction, and Legitimacy, 46 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 849 (2014).
99. See John Dugard, The Nuclear Tests Cases and the South West Africa Cases: Some Realism

About the InternationalJudicialDecision, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 463, 475 (1976).
100. E.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits,
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶¶ 10, 17 (June 27); Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Merits, Judgment,
1974 I.C.J. Rep. 3, I¶ 13-14 (July 25); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Judgment, 1978
I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 14 (Dec. 19).
101. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex VII, art. 9.
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International Justice (PCIJ)1 02 and the ICJ Statute, 0 3 but also with the jurisprudence
of the PCIJ`" and the ICJ. 10o It makes practical sense because otherwise a state
would be able to halt any set of proceedings instituted against it by simply not
participating. Nevertheless, just because the proceedings may continue does not
mean that the legitimacy of the proceedings is left unscathed.
There is a large literature on the non-participation of states in interstate dispute
settlement proceedings.'I Suffice it to say that the non-participation of a party
undermines the legitimacy of the proceedings. Only one party presents its arguments
to the tribunal, only one party furnishes evidence to the tribunal, and only one party
responds to the tribunal's concerns. For this reason, Article 9 of Annex VII provides
that in the case of non-appearance: "Before making its award, the arbitral tribunal
must satisfy itself not only that it has jurisdiction over the dispute but also that the
09
claim is well founded in fact and law." 07 The PCIJ Statute' and the ICJ Statute
contain similar wording. As the Philippines v. China tribunal explained, "[tihe
imposes a special responsibility on the
situation of a non-participating Party ...
Tribunal. It cannot, in China's absence, simply accept the Philippines' claims or
enter a default judgment." 0
In Philippines v. China, China did not participate in the proceedings."' Its
Ministry of Foreign Affairs did, however, publish a "position paper" laying out legal
arguments against the tribunal's jurisdiction."l 2 Notably, this approach of filing a
short, informal written submission without formally participating in the proceedings
has quite a long history. To cite a few examples, Turkey did this in Aegean
Continental Shelf' '3 Iran did this in Tehran Hostages,"4 France did this in the
102. Statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 53, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 389
("Whenever one of the parties shall not appear before the Court, or shall fail to defend his case, the other
party may call upon the Court to decide in favour of his claim.") [hereinafter PCIJ Statute].

103. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 53(1), June 26, 1945, 3 Bevans 1179
("Whenever one of the parties does not appear before the Court, or fails to defend its case, the other party
may call upon the Court to decide in favour of its claim.") [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
104. See JEROME.B. ELKIND, NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE,

31-37 (1984).
105. See id. at 38-77.
106. See id; H. W. A. THIRLWAY, NON-APPEARANCE BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE (1985); Matthias Goldmann, InternationalCourts and Tribunals, Non-Appearance, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Aug. 2006).

107. UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex VII, art. 9.
108. PCIJ Statute, supra note 102, art. 53 ("The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only
that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in
fact and law.").
109. ICJ Statute, supra note 103, art. 53(2) ("The Court must, before doing so, satisfy itself, not only
that it has jurisdiction in accordance with Articles 36 and 37, but also that the claim is well founded in
fact and law.").
110. Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supranote 3, 11¶ 11-12.
111. Phil. v. China, Award, supra note 3, ¶11.
112. Id. ¶ 13.
113. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Judgment, 1978 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 114 (Dec. 19).
114. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 1980 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, 1|10 (May 24).
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s and Russia did this in Arctic Sunrise."'

Thanks to China's position paper, the tribunal and the Philippines were able to
at least identify China's principal jurisdictional objections.'"7 Nevertheless, the
tribunal and the Philippines still had to consider other preliminary objections that
China could have raised,"' as well as arguments that China could have made on the
merits.11 9 The fact that China neither presented its arguments in detail (e.g., through
formal written and oral submissions), nor furnished evidence to the tribunal, nor
responded to the tribunal's concerns nonetheless harmed the legitimacy of the
tribunal. Indeed, at least one commentator has questioned the legitimacy of the
Philippinesv. China proceedings based on the non-participation of China.12 0
Russia's record in participating in international dispute settlement proceedings
is mixed. On the one hand, it did not participate in the only other UNCLOS Annex
VII arbitration filed against it, Arctic Sunrise.'2 ' It has also refused to participate in
at least eight Crimea investor-state arbitrations.1 22 At least one commentator has thus
surmised that Russia will not participate in Ukraine v. Russia.'23 On the other hand,
Russia has participated in virtually all other investor-state arbitrations in which it
has been involved, including the $50 billion arbitrations with the Yukos majority

115. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 253, 1 13 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests
(N.Z. v. Fr.), Judgment, 1974 I.C.J. Rep. 457, 113 (Dec. 20).
116. Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), PCA Case No. 2014-02, Award on Jurisdiction, T 9 (Nov. 26,
2014), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1325.
117. Phil. v. China, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, supra note 3, 'A 121-22.
118. Id.1123.
119. Phil. v. China, Award, supra note 3, ¶ 144.
120. Xuechan Ma, South China Sea Arbitration: Non-appearance and the Guarantee of Justice,
LEIDEN LAW BLOG (Aug. 4, 2016), http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/south-china-sea-arbitration-nonappearance-and-the-guarantee-of-justice.

121. Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.), PCA Case No. 2014-02, Award on the Merits,
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(Aug. 14,

2015), https://www.pcacases.com/web/sendAttach/1438.

122. The eight publicly known cases are: (1) Aeroport Belbek LLC and Mr. Igor Valerievich
Kolomoisky v. The Russian Federation; (2) PJSC CB PrivatBank and Finance Company Finilon LLC v.
The Russian Federation; (3) Limited Liability Company Lugzor, Limited Liability Company Libset,
Limited Liability Company Ukrinterinvest, Public Joint Stock Company DniproAzot, Limited Liability
Company Aberon Ltd v. The Russian Federation; (4) Stabil LLC, Rubenor LLC, Rustel LLC, NovelEstate LLC, P1I Kirovograd-Nafta LLC, Crimea-Petrol LLC, Pirsan LLC, Trade-Trust LLC, Elefteria
LLC, VKF Satek LLC, Stemv Group LLC v. The Russian Federation; (5) PJSC Ukrnafta v. The Russian
Federation; (6) Everest Estate LLC et al. v. The Russian Federation; (7) NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine
(Ukraine) et al. v. The Russian Federation; and (8) Oschadbank v. The Russian Federation. For
information

on the first seven cases,

see Permanent Court of Arbitration, Cases, https://pca-

cpa.org/en/cases/ (last visited Dec. 17, 2017). For information on the eighth case, see Lacey Yong, Russia
Faces US$2.6 Billion Claim

Over Losses in Crimea, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Oct.

20, 2016),

http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1 069603/russia-faces-ususd26-billion-claim-over-losses-incrimea/. For information on a potential ninth case, see Lacey Yong, Further Crimea Claim Launched
(Apr.
i1,
2017),
GLOBAL
ARB.
REV.
Against
Russia,
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/I139246/further-crimea-claim-launched-against-russia.
123. Julian Ku, As Ukraine Prepares to Take Russia to UNCLOS Arbitration Over Crimea, I Predict

Russia's

Likely

Reaction,

OPINIo

JURIS

(Feb.

1,

2016,

http://opiniojuris.org/2016/02/01/ukraine-prepares-to-take-russia-to-unclos-arbitration/.
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shareholders.124 Russia also participated in all three prompt release cases before the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in which it was involved,' 25
it participated in Georgiav. Russia before the ICJ, 2 6 and it is currently participating
in the recent case that Ukraine filed against it before the ICJ.12 7
Indeed, Russia has thus far fully participated in the UNCLOS arbitration. It has
appointed an arbitrator,' 28 attended the first procedural meeting,1 2 9 and has appointed
an agent and internationally renowned counsel.1 30 If Russia continues to fully engage
with the arbitration, the legitimacy concerns that arose in Philippines v. China by
virtue of China's non-appearance will not be relevant for Ukraine v. Russia.
B. The Optics of the Impartialityof the Tribunal
As both Philippines v. China and Ukraine v. Russia have been brought under
Annex VII of UNCLOS, the procedure for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal is
the same.'"' The applicant appoints one arbitrator, the respondent appoints another,
and the parties jointly appoint three additional arbitrators.' 32 in cases where the
respondent does not appoint an arbitrator and/or the parties cannot agree on the three
additional arbitrators, the President of ITLOS makes the appointment(s).' 33 If,
however, the President is a national of one of the parties to the dispute, the next most
senior member of ITLOS who is not a national of one of the parties makes the

124. See, e.g., Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) v. Russ., PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226,
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1 32 (Nov. 30, 2009); Hulley Enterprises Limited
(Cyprus) v. Russ., PCA Case No. 2005-03/AA226, Final Award, 149 (July 18, 2014); Alison Ross, US
$50 Billion Yukos Awards Set Aside in The Hague, GLOBAL ARB. REv. (Apr. 20, 2016),
http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1035468/ususd5O-billion-yukos-awards-set-aside-in-thehague; "Baiting the Bear": Yukos Enforcement Updates from Around the World, GLOBAL ARB. REV.

(Apr.

19,

2016),

http://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1035467/%E2%80%9Cbaiting-the-

bear/oE2%80%9D-yukos-enforcement-updates-from-around-the-world.

125. The "Volga" Case (Russ. v. Austl.), ITLOS Case No. I1, Prompt Release, Judgment, 2002
ITLOS Rep. 10, 1 25 (Dec. 23, 2002); The "Hoshinmaru" Case (Japan v. Russ.), ITLOS Case No. 14,
Prompt Release, Judgment, 2005-2007 ITLOS Rep. 18, N 18 (Aug. 6, 2007); The "Tominmaru" Case
(Japan v. Russ.), ITLOS Case No. 15, Prompt Release, Judgment, 2005-2007 ITLOS Rep. 74, ¶ 17 (Aug.
6, 2007).
126. Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Geor. v. Russ.), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 2011 I.C.J. Rep. 70, 1 14 (Apr. 1);
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Geor. v. Russ.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2008 I.C.J. Rep. 353, T 50 (Oct. 15).
127. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukr. v.
Russ.), Provisional Measures, Order, 2017 I.C.J. Rep., 1 13 (Apr. 19).
128. Press Release, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Ukraine v. The Russian Federation: First
ProceduralMeeting in Arbitration Under the Law of the Sea Convention (May 22, 2017).

129. Id.
130. Dispute Concerning Coastal State Rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and Kerch Strait (Ukr.
v. Russ.), Permanent Court of Arbitration, PCA Case Repository, https://pcacases.com/web/view/ 149.

131. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex VII, art. 3.
132. Id. at Annex VII, art. 3(b) - (d).
133. Id. at Annex VII, art. 3(c) - (e).
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appointment(s).1 3 4
In Philippines v. China, the Philippines appointed Judge Rildiger Wolfrum
(Germany).' As China did not participate in the proceedings, the remaining four
appointments were left to the President of ITLOS,' 6 who at the time was Judge
Shunji Yanai (Japan)."' He appointed Judge Stanislaw Pawlak (Poland), Judge
Jean-Pierre Cot (France), Professor Alfred H.A. Soons (Netherlands), and, as
presiding arbitrator, Judge Thomas A. Mensah (Ghana). 3 8
Although the tribunal was constituted in complete accordance with Annex VII
of UNCLOS, one cannot ignore the optics concerning the lack of impartiality of the
tribunal. First, Judge Wolfrum is known for his expansive views on the jurisdiction
of UNCLOS tribunals, particularly with regard to UNCLOS disputes implicating
issues of territorial sovereignty.' 39 Second, Japan itself is involved in territorial
sovereignty disputes with China in the East China Sea,' 40 and the antagonism
between China and Japan is no secret.' 4 ' Third, four of the five members of the
tribunal were European, suggesting that the tribunal may not have been able to
consider the diversity of perspectives in international law.' 42 Indeed, Chinese
officials and Chinese media have commented on Judge Wolfrum's alleged projurisdiction bias,' 4 3 Judge Yanai's alleged anti-China bias,'" and the dominance of

134. Id. at Annex VII, art. 3(e).
135. Phil. v. China, Award, supra note 3, 1 30.
136. Id.
137. See Judge Shunji Yanai, INT'L TRIB. FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, https://www.itlos.org/thetribunal/members/judge-shunji-yanai/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2017).
138. Phil. v. China, Award, supra note 3, 1 30.
139. See Rildiger Wolfrum, Statement to the Informal Meeting of Legal Advisers of Ministries of
Foreign

Affairs,

INT'L

TRIBUNAL

FOR THE

LAW

OF

THE

SEA,

at

6

(Oct.

23,

2006),

https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/statements of president/wolfrm/legaladvisors_2310
06 eng.pdf. After his appointment in Philippinesv. China, his pro-jurisdiction views became even more
well known in his joint dissenting and concurring opinion with Judge Kateka in Mauritius v. United
Kingdom. See Chagos Marine Protected Area (Mauritius v. U.K.), PCA Case No. 2011-03, Dissenting
and Concurring Opinion of Judges Kateka and Wolfrum (Mar. 18, 2015).
140. See Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, InternationalLaw and Japan's TerritorialDisputes, 92 INT'L L.
STUD. 119, 136-51 (2016).
RELATIONS IN THE
141. See CHINA-JAPAN
INTERDEPENDENCY 19-20 (Peng Er Lam ed., 2017).
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ANTAGONISM
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142. See supra text accompanying notes 135-138.
143. E.g., South China Sea Arbitration Decided by Biased Arbitrators, GLOBAL TIMES (July 19,
2016), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/995265.shtml.
144. E.g., Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Beifing: Japanese Judge Means South ChinaSea TribunalIs
Biased, FOREIGN POL'Y (June 21, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/21/beijing-japanese-judgemeans-south-china-sea-tribunal-is-biased-china-philippines-maritime-claims/; Chun Han Wong, Beijing
Lashes Out at South China Sea Tribunal - and the People on It, WALL STREET J. (July 13, 2016),
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/07/13/beijing-lashes-out-at-south-china-sea-tribunal-and-thepeople-on-it/; Liu Zhen, Questions ofNeutrality: China Takes Aim at Judges in South China Sea Case,
SOUTH

CHINA

MORNING

POST (July

11,

2016),

http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-

defence/article/1988119/questions-neutrality-china-takes-aim-judges-south-china;
ArbitrationDecided By Biased Arbitrators,supra note 143.

South China Sea

18

VOL. 46:1

DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

Europeans on the tribunal. 1 45

'

In Ukraine v. Russia, Ukraine appointed Professor Vaughan Lowe (United
Kingdom) and Russia appointed Judge Vladimir Golitsyn (Russia).1 4 6 It is not
publicly known whether Ukraine and Russia agreed on the three additional
arbitrators, but it appears that they did not.1 47 Normally, the appointment of those
arbitrators would be left to the President of ITLOS. 148 However, as the President of
ITLOS at the time was Judge Golitsyn,14 9 a Russian national, the appointment power
fell on the Vice-President of ITLOS,'5 0 who at the time was Judge Boualem
Bouguetaia, '5' an Algerian national. The remaining three arbitrators appointed to the
Ukraine v. Russia tribunal, presumably by Judge Bouguetaia,' 52 are Judge
Bouguetaia himself (Algeria), Judge Alonso Gomez-Robledo (Mexico), and, as
presiding arbitrator, Judge Jin-Hyun Paik (South Korea).' 5
The optics of the composition of the Ukraine v. Russia tribunal are better. First,
none of the arbitrators are widely known for pro-jurisdiction tendencies in UNCLOS
disputes. Second, there is nothing that immediately suggests that Judge Bouguetaia
would be biased in his selection of arbitrators for the dispute. To the contrary, the
fact that Algeria abstained from the vote at the U.N. General Assembly calling for
the non-recognition of the Crimea referendum 5 4 gives an impression of impartiality.
Third, the arbitrators are geographically diverse, with one from Western Europe, one
from Eastern Europe, one from North Africa, one from Latin America, and one from
East Asia.' 5
Nevertheless, if it is indeed true that Judge Bouguetaia appointed the three
145. E.g., Xie Feng, The DangerousArbitrationofBeifing-ManilaDispute, JAKARTA POST (June 9,
2016, 9:47 AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2016/06/09/the-dangerous-arbitration-ofbeijing-manila-dispute.html; Wong, supra note 144; Zhen, supra note 144.
146. The Hearing of the Case Ukraine v. Russian Federation Under UNCLOS Will Start at the
Beginning of 2017, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF UKR. (Dec. 23, 2016), http://mfa.gov.ua/en/press-

center/news/53422-na-pochatku-2017-roku-rozpochnetysya-rozglyad-spravi-ukrajina-proti-rosijsykojifederaciji-zgidno-z- [hereinafter Ukrainian Statement on Hearing].
147.

The statement by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealing the constitution of the

tribunal noted: "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine expresses its gratitude to the Vice-President
of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea for rapid formation of the tribunal." Id. This statement

suggests that Judge Bouguetaia, the Vice-President of ITLOS, appointed the remaining three arbitrators.
This would be consistent with the procedures for appointment under Annex VII of UNCLOS since the

President of ITLOS is a national of one of the parties to the dispute. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, Annex
VII, art. 3(e).
148. See UNCLOS, supranote 1, Annex VII, art. 3(e).
149. President Vladimir Vladimirovich Golitsyn, INT'L TRIB. FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA,
https://www.itlos.org/the-tribunal/members/president-vladimir-vladimirovich-golitsyn/ (last visited Oct.

23, 2016).
150. See supra note 147.
151. Vice-President Boualem Bouguetaia, INT'L TRIB. FOR THE
https://www.itlos.org/the-tribunal/members/vice-president-boualem-bouguetaia/
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(last visited Oct. 23,

2016).
152. See supra note 147.
153.

Ukrainian Statement on Hearing, supra note 146.

154. U.N. GAOR, 68th Sess., 80th plen. mtg. at 17, U.N. Doc. A/68/PV.80 (Mar. 27, 2014).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 146-153.
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additional members of the tribunal, 5 6 one cannot omit from this discussion the
elephant in the room: Judge Bouguetaia's self-appointment. There is almost no
literature on the propriety of self-appointment in international arbitration.' In
another recent UNCLOS case, Enrica Lexie, Judge Golitsyn appointed himself as
the presiding arbitrator.' But this instance of self-appointment appears also to have
gone under the radar of commentators.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article concludes that the Ukraine v. Russia tribunal faces jurisdictional
obstacles greater than those faced by the Philippinesv. China tribunal, even though
the legitimacy of the Ukraine v. Russia proceedings is greater than that of the
Philippines v. China proceedings. Notably, this Article's conclusions are
comparative. It does not attempt to divine how the Ukraine v. Russia tribunal will
rule on its jurisdiction, nor does it make any assertion concerning the absolute
legitimacy of either the Ukraine v. Russia proceedings or the Philippinesv. China
proceedings. Rather, it merely aims to show that there are certain key differences
between these two cases.
Much has yet to be seen with regards to Ukrainev. Russia. Will Russia continue
to fully participate in the arbitration? Will the tribunal uphold its jurisdiction? In the
event of an adverse decision, will Russia comply with the award? This Article
obviously cannot answer any of these questions. But it is hoped that the Article has
at the very least provided a helpful preliminary examination of some of the key
issues in Ukraine v. Russia against the backdrop of Philippinesv. China.

156. See supranote 147.
157. At the present moment, the author's own blog post on the topic appears to be the only academic
writing that addresses the issue. See Peter Tzeng, Self-Appointment in InternationalArbitration, EJIL:
TALK! (June 7, 2017), https://www.ejiltalk.org/self-appointment-in-intemational-arbitration/.
158. The "Enrica Lexie" Incident (it. v. India), PCA Case No. 2015-28, Provisional Measures,
Order, T 14 (Apr. 29, 2016).

